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Abstract— A “reverse merger” (RM) has become a popular 
transaction that allows a private company to take over a publicly 
traded firm and obtain their exchange listing. RMs have 
significantly outnumbered IPOs as a mechanism for going public 
in the U.S. since 2002. Moreover, foreign firms entering the U.S. 
have accounted for over 40% of RMs taking place on U.S. 
exchanges from 2008 - 2013, as compared to approximately 10% 
of all cross-listings and 7% of all IPOs during the same period. 
Chinese firms have been participants in 63% of all foreign RMs 
since 2008. This study is the first to focus on foreign and domestic 
RM’s use of PIPEs (Private Investment in Public Equity). When 
compared to RMs transacted between two U.S. firms, this analysis 
finds Chinese firms who engage in RMs through the use of PIPES 
(traditional and structured), on average, 1) raise over 400% more 
initial investment, 2) experience higher post-merger market 
capitalization valuations at closing and post-merger, 3) take place 
on higher level U.S. stock exchanges, 4) have a higher rate of 
survival (influenced by sector) and 5) experience significantly 
better short and long-term buy and hold returns. 
Keywords-Chinese; Reverse Merger; Reverse Takeover; PIPE 
I. INTRODUCTION
     The reverse merger (RM) process is an acquisition where the 
target firm's management seeks a public entity with which to 
merge and obtain their exchange listing [1]. As opposed to cross-
listing, an RM (sometimes termed a “reverse takeover”) 1) 
avoids most SEC scrutiny [2], 2) can be completed quickly (1 to 
2 months versus 4 to 14 months) [3], 3) is significantly less 
expensive with no fundraising or underwriter fees [3, 4], 4) 
allows motivated participants to extract cash from the global 
market [5] and 5) avoids substantial ownership dilution [6]. 
   RMs have significantly outnumbered IPOs as a mechanism for 
going public in the United States since 2002 [7, 8]. In the period 
January 1, 2008, through December 31, 2013, foreign firms 
entering the U.S. have accounted for over 40% of RMs taking 
place on U.S. exchanges [8].  Despite the large number of 
foreign RM transactions, there have been few related academic 
studies.  As such, we focus on Chinese firms as they represent 
the vast majority of the foreign RMs which have taken place in 
the U.S. (63% from 2008-2014). Another motivation to study 
Chinese RMs stems from the financial media accusations of 
accounting fraud from 2010 – 2012, which led to approximately 
47 Chinese RMs being delisted [7, 9, 10]. Although many 
accusations were not substantiated [11], Chinese listed firms, in 
general, suffered and lost over 72% market capitalization 
between 2010 and 2012. In February 2012 The Economist 
reported the news coverage was exaggerated and that investors 
should not assume all Chinese firms were not audited properly. 
Since 2012, Chinese RM numbers are rapidly growing again and 
the market losses were recovered in 2015. As Figure 1 depicts, 
587 Chinese RMs were consummated during 2004 - 2014, 
representing over $54 billion in combined capitalization [8]. As 
the chart reflects, Chinese RMs have grown at a rate of 32 – 50 
% per year since 2012. This rapid resurgence in the number of 
Chinese RMs and ongoing investigations have investors 
questioning the related adjusted risk returns and help motivate 
this study. 
Figure 1 - Number of Chinese Reverse Mergers by year 2004-2014 
     This paper is the first to provide the influence of PIPEs 
(traditional and structured) on both foreign and domestic firms 
that transact RMs on U.S stock exchanges. We also analyze their 
initial and short-term capitalization, levels of stock exchange 
entry, industries, and short to long term buy and hold stock 
performance for those that use PIPEs versus RMs that do not.  
     This study finds Chinese RMs, when compared to U.S. RMs, 
overall, are significantly bigger, grow assets faster, are less 
likely to use PIPES but have significantly larger transactions and 
hold more insider stock. In addition, when compared to RMs 
transacted between two U.S. firms, on average, Chinese 
companies who engage in RMs through the use of PIPES 1) raise 
over 400% more initial investment, 2) experience higher post-
merger market capitalization valuations, 3) take place on 
advanced level U.S. stock exchanges, 4) have a higher rate of 
survival and 5) experience significantly better short- and long-
term performance. Our study also finds PIPE financing to be a 
major source of funding for the Chinese RMs that locate on 
higher exchanges as opposed to very few U.S. RMs. and those 
that open on higher exchanges using PIPES have a higher chance 
of survival than those that do not use PIPES or that open on the 
OTC exchange. 
     The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II 
reviews the relevant literature. Section III describes the data 
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sample and provides financial transaction summaries. Section 
IV presents the empirical analysis results and Section V 
concludes and suggests implications for investors. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Despite the significant number of reverse mergers, there 
have been few related academic studies. Gleason, Rosenthal, 
and Wiggins (2005) review 121 RMs that took place on the 
NYSE and NASDAQ-AMEX exchanges in 1987 through 2001 
and find significant short-term announcement gains for many 
transactions [12]. Gleason, Jain, and Rosenthal (2006) compare 
RMs to traditional and self-underwritten IPOs [4]. They study 
119 RM transactions between companies listed on the major 
stock exchanges between 1986 and 2002 and find RMs and self-
underwritten IPO companies overall are smaller with lower 
profitability and outperform traditional IPOs over the first few 
months.  Adjei, Cyree and Walker (2008) study 286 U.S. RMs 
from 1990 through 2002, and find 42% of RMs are delisted 
within three years of going public [13]. Carpentier, Cumming, 
and Suret (2012) find Canadian companies that go public using 
RMs generally have poor performance after going public [14]. 
Floros and Shastri (2009) study the decision to go public 
comparing RMs between U.S. based private and public firms 
listed on U.S. stock exchanges versus penny stock IPOs [6]. 
They argue companies involved with RMs are information 
asymmetric as minimal stock is issued to the public. Floros and 
Sapp (2010) find a significant percentage of U. S. RM shell 
companies are profitable short-term investments with returns of 
48.1% over the first three months [2].  
There are very few studies of RMs involving foreign firms. 
Makamson (2010) studies RMs from 1994 through 2008 and 
argues overseas RM participants are motivated to raise capital in 
a distant market [15]. Jindra, Voetmann, and Walkling (2012) 
contrast the performance of Chinese RMs to Chinese IPOs and 
overall find Chinese IPO firms outperform their RM 
counterparts [16]. Lee, Li, and Zhang (2013) find Chinese RMs 
are more profitable and have higher longevity over their first 
three years than matched U.S. RMs [17]. DuVal and Quilliam 
(2015) find Chinese RMs experienced higher long-term returns 
when compared to U.S. cross-listed Chinese firms, the Russell 
2000 and U.S. RMs from 2008 through 2014 [18].  
There is extensive academic study on the performance of 
companies using private placements (PIPES), however, 
empirical studies of the use of PIPES in RMS has been scant. 
Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck, and Rees (2002) study the long- term 
performance of companies issuing PIPES and find positive 
returns at announcement but become abnormally low the 
following three years [19]. Hillion and Vermaelen (2004) also 
show many PIPE funded firms perform poorly in the long term 
[20]. Gleason, Rosenthal, and Wiggin’s (2005) report their 
sample of rather large public U.S. RM participants using PIPEs 
are poor performers and deemed a high-risk choice for going 
public [12]. In contrast, DuVal and Quilliam’s (2015) results, 
despite many findings in the literature to the contrary, reveal a 
statistically significant relationship between the use of PIPES 
and positive returns [18]. These conflicting results motivate this 
detailed study of the influence of PIPES in foreign and domestic 
RMs. 
In summary, most previous studies have focused on reverse 
mergers between companies that are already operating and listed 
on a U.S. or Canadian stock exchange. Few studies to date have 
focused on foreign firms that conduct reverse mergers in the 
U.S., particularly those funded with PIPES. As foreign RMs 
have once again significantly increased in numbers, this topic is 
important to investors and others studying RMs. 
III. DATA SAMPLE AND FINANCIAL TRANSACTION 
SUMMARIES 
Generally, RM transaction data is not readily available, with 
most participating firms traded on pink sheets or the Over the 
Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB) and not followed by popular 
financial transaction sites. We obtain most of the detailed RM 
data from PrivateRaise, a subsidiary of DealFlow Media 
(DFPR). PrivateRaise has tracked RM deals in detail since 
January 2004. From 2004 – 2013, 521 RMs were consummated 
involving Chinese firms. Since 2008, DFPR followed RM 
transactions in significantly more detail, which leads to our 310 
Chinese and 492 U.S. RM six year subsample that took place 
between 2008 and 2013. Although PrivateRaise reports the 
average stock price at RM closing during this period is $3.51 for 
Chinese RMs and $2.54 for U.S. RMs, they do not collect 
ongoing stock price data.  We obtain daily stock data and 
financial statement information from 8-K/As, 8-Ks, 10Ks, SC-
14F1s, Bloomberg, and Yahoo Finance.  
      Due to smaller companies, on average, participating in RMs 
with information asymmetry, the literature argues these 
transactions not be compared to traditional IPOs [1, 2, 6]. 
Therefore, like DuVal and Quilliam (2015), we compare 
Chinese RMs to those consummated between two U.S. firms 
that took place during the same period [18].  
Sjostrom (2008) argues access to PIPE financing (typically 
supplied by hedge funds) is the primary reason firms choose 
RMs as the vehicle by which to go public, as they have no other 
alternatives for capital [1]. Table 1 reports 34.19% (106 of 310) 
of Chinese RMs use PIPEs to fund their RMs compared to 
41.26% (203 of 492) of U.S. RMs. These percentages of RMs 
using PIPES are significantly lower than the average of 67.23% 
reported by Floros and Shastri (2009) in their earlier U.S. based 
RM sample [6]. In contrast, this current study's results are much 
higher than the 20% reported in Gleason's 2005 sample of U.S. 
RM's that used PIPES between 1987 and 2001. Table 1 also 
reveals Chinese RMs raise over 426% more capital (to include 
PIPEs), on average, at the time of the transaction than U.S. RMs 
($7.47 million versus $1.75 million). This result appears to 
support DuVal and Quilliam’s (2015) hypothesis that Chinese 
RM participants seek quick infusions of capital [18]. 
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Table 1 - Chinese and U.S. Reverse Mergers Summary Statistics 2008-2013 
 
As reflected in Panel A of Table 2, the average market 
capitalization of Chinese RMs ($75.9 million) at closing is over 
47% higher than U.S. RMs ($51.5 million). In comparison, 
Gleason, Rosenthal and Wiggins (2005) find the values of their 
1986-2002 U.S. RM sample to have a mean of $8.4 million 
(median of $1.76 million) [12]. After four weeks, on average, 
the Chinese RMs’ market capitalization grows by over 26% 
($75.9 M to $95.7M) versus U.S. RM’s growth of 12% ($51.5 
M to $57.7 M). Overall, these results appear to support DuVal 
and Quilliam’s (2015) hypothesis that Chinese RMs seek more 
capital and grow assets at a faster pace than U.S. RMs [18]. 
Panel B of Table 2 compares the lowest, average and highest 
post-merger stock prices at the transaction's closing to the same 
values four weeks later. Overall, Chinese RMs at transaction 
closing open at prices over 50% higher than U.S RMs ($3.51 
compared to $2.54) and, during the first four weeks of operation, 
the Chinese RMs average stock price increases over 27% ($3.51 
to $4.46) as compared to the U.S. RM price decrease of 
approximately 4% ($2.54 to $2.45). 
Table 2 - China and U.S. RM market capitalization comparisons 2008-2013 
 
 
      Table 3 reveals that Chinese RMs have higher averages than 
U.S. RMs for both ownership percentages issued in the share 
exchange without PIPES (86.3% versus 73.4%) and with PIPEs 
(85.89% versus 74.1%). Although not reported in this table, 
19% of Chinese RMs during this period involved shell 
companies as compared to 64% of U.S. RMs. These results 
indicate Chinese and U.S. RMs release significantly more stock 
to the public as compared to the 3% reported by the Floros and 
Sapp (2010) RM shell company sample [2].  
 
Table 3 - Percentage ownership summary statistics for Chinese and U.S. RMs 
2008-2013 
     
      Table 4 reports Chinese RMs are far more likely to take place 
on higher level stock exchanges than U.S. RMs, as 7.7% (24 of 
310) of Chinese firms enter on the NYSE or NASDAQ versus 
only 1.4% (7 of 492) of the U.S. RMs. As found in previous 
studies (e.g., Gleason, Rosenthal, and Wiggins, 2005; DuVal 
and Quilliam, 2015), this table shows most Chinese (78.71%) 
and U.S. RMs (84.15%) take place on the OTTBB exchange [12, 
18]. Also PIPE financing appears to be an important source of 
funding for the Chinese RMs that locate on more prestigious 
exchanges as opposed to U.S. RMs, which show a limited use of 
PIPEs. Although not reported in this table, regression analysis 
shows Chinese RMs that open on higher exchanges (NYSE or 
NASDAQ) using PIPES have a 38% higher chance of survival 
than those that do not use PIPES and 41% higher than those that 
open on the OTC stock market. 
Table 4 - Initial exchange listing summary statistics for Chinese and U.S. RMs 
2008-2013 
               
      Table 5 breaks down the samples by industry for the period. 
When compared to U.S. RMs, Chinese RMs are more inclined 
to do business in basic materials (10.3% to 4.9%) and 
consumer/retail (31.2% to 9.8%). U.S. RMs are more 
concentrated in energy (14% to 5.1%), financial institutions (3% 
to 1.3%), industrial (19.5% to 11%) and media (7.9% to 2.9%). 
 
                     
        China     U.S.  







Total Number of Reverse 






Total Dollars Raised in Reverse 
Merger + PIPE Transactions: 
$792.7 M $356.1 M 
 
Average Dollars Raised in 
Reverse Merger + PIPE 
Transactions: 
$7.47 M $1.75 M 
 
 
Panel A: Post-merger China and U.S. market capitalization comparisons  
 
 
China Market Cap U.S. Market Cap 
Post-Merger  
Valuation Metrics 
Low Average High Low Average High 
At Reverse Merger 
Closing(millions) 
$0.1  $75.9  $697.2  $0.3  $51.5  $633.6  
4-wk Post-Closing  
Stock Price(millions) 
$0.1  $95.7  $971.0  $0.2  $57.7  $692.3  
4-wk Post-Closing 
VWAP(millions) 
$0.1  $88.1  $673.1  $0.2  $54.4  $689.8  
 
Panel B. Post-merger China and U.S. stock price comparisons 
                
                                               China Stock Price                     U.S. Stock Price 
Post-Merger  
Valuation Metrics 
Low Average High   Low Average High 
At Reverse Merger 
Closing 
0.01    3.51 35.33   0.01    2.54 16.88 
4-wk Post-Closing  
Stock Price 
0.01    4.46 55.94   0.01    2.45 16.22 
4-wk Post-Closing 
VWAP 
0.01    4.22 54.87   0.01    2.37 13.06 
	









Low Average High Low Average High 
Percentage 
Issued in Share 
Exchange 
0.00 86.34 100.00 1.30 73.40 100.00 
Percentage 
Issued PIPE 
0.10 36.16 504.66 0.10 37.65 275.88 
Percentage 
Issued in Share 
Exchange + 
PIPE 
14.60 85.89 100.00 1.60 74.10 100.00 
	
                              





















NASDAQ-GS 0 0 0.0 M 0 0 0.0 M 
NASDAQ-GM 9 8 12.3 M 3 1 1.1 M 
NASDAQ-CM 14 12 183.9 M 3 1 10.8 M 
NYSE  1 1 11.8 M 1 0 0.0 M 
OTC BB 244 76 482.2 M 414 185 323.8 M 
OTC 14 0 0.0 M 41 7 14.6 M 
Never Trade 28 10 102.5 M 29 9 5.8 M 
Totals 310 106 792.7 M 492 203 356.1 M 
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Table 5 - Initial industry distribution for Chinese and U.S. RMs 2008-2013 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In an effort to make direct comparisons of returns over time, 
we use formulas from previous RM studies. Like Gleason, Jain, 
and Rosenthal (2006), we calculate buy and hold returns (BHR) 
for N firms as [4]:    






𝑤𝑖 = average holding period weight for stock i
𝑅𝑖𝑡= stock i’s return on day t
𝑇𝑖 = delisted date or the end of the holding period, whichever   
 comes first 
     Following Floros and Sapp (2010), we use the Fama-French 
three-factor regression model as a benchmark, where the return 
of a portfolio of reverse mergers is more than the one-month T-
bill return [2]. The BHR abnormal returns are derived with an 
equally weighted portfolio. Similar results were experienced in 
a value-weighted portfolio. 
     Many of these Chinese RM stocks are initially thinly traded 
and therefore have significant spreads between the bid and ask 
pricing.  Floros and Sapp (2010) find their median RM shell 
companies’ range is close to 45% [2]. We follow the 
recommendations made by Fisher, Weaver and Webb (2009) 
and Floros and Sapp (2010), and use the midpoint of the spread 
to mitigate the bid-ask bounce [2, 21]. 
     Using daily returns beginning 30 days before the RM, we 
study the performance of the 272 Chinese and 463 U.S. RM 
participants that traded stock before and after they consummate 
the transaction. We begin by examining the returns from 30 days 
prior to 30 days after the RM is transacted. U.S. RMs, on 
average, experience an overall return of approximately 15% 
during the 60 day period. The total sample of Chinese RMs (with 
and without the use of PIPES) has an average return of 
approximately 35%. Although the Chinese RM result appears 
significant, Floros and Sapp (2010) report their RM shell sample 
firms experience a 54% increase in this 60 day window [2].  
     Also, as other studies have shown (e.g., Gleason, Rosenthal, 
and Wiggins, 2005; Floros and Sapp, 2010) and the graph 
depicts, the results indicate evidence of an increase in wealth to 
the public firm's stockholders after the announcement dates [2, 
4]. Gleason, Rosenthal and Wiggins (2005) and Floros and Sapp 
(2010) have similar outcomes and suggest insiders are investing 
more capital and increasing the price as a successful transaction 
becomes more evident [2, 4]. There is also a price correction for 
both U.S. and Chinese RMs within a few day window following 
the consummation date that appears to reflect the market's 
reaction to the SEC documents required within four days 
following the transaction. Overall, however, Chinese RMs 
significantly outperform U.S. RMs over the 60 day period.  
Figure 2 - Reverse merger [-30 day, +30 day] returns comparison of 
Chinese and U.S. RMs 2008 - 2013 
Prior research (e.g., Gleason, Rosenthal, and Wiggins, 2005; 
Floros and Shastri, 2009) reports RMs' BHRs are different when 
comparing those that use PIPES and those firms that do not [2, 
6]. Table 6 separates the Chinese and U.S. RM sample into 
PIPE/non-PIPE transactions and presents the short- and long-run 
BHRs for various event windows. The total sample varies by 
year for each set as noted in column N in each panel, revealing 
that the majority of transactions do not use PIPES and fewer 
firms exist over time. The Chinese and U.S. RM's results report 
performance for the period January 1, 2008, through December 
31, 2013. The stocks are equally valued, and the BHRs represent 
the cumulative market change over the relevant event window. 
Panel A reflects results for those firms that do not use PIPES, 
and Panel B reports results for those companies that use PIPE 
financing at the time of the initial transaction.  The results are 
significantly different when comparing Chinese RM to U.S. RM 
returns, with and without the use of PIPES.  
Table 6, Panel A’s first event window (-30, -1) reports the 
change in price during the 30 days before the RM transaction. 
Chinese RM firms, on average, that do not use PIPES realize a 
9.88% return as opposed to the U.S. RM non-PIPE return of 
4.83%. Over time, the Chinese non-PIPE RMs never yield a 
negative return and those that survive yield a 23.65% average 
return over their first four years. The U.S. non-PIPE sample, 
however, although profitable over time, yields negative returns 
over the first 90 days and for those firms that survive, 6.51% 
over the first four years as opposed to the Chinese RM four-year 
return of 23.65%.  
Table 6, Panel B shows all the Chinese PIPE RM event 

















Basic Materials 32 18 177.8 M 24 15 9.1 M 
Consumer/Retail 99 37 199.3 M 48 18 26.7 M 
Energy 16 9 78.9 M 69 34 67.5 M 
Financial 
Institutions 
4 0 0.0 M 15 4 0.9 M 
Healthcare 49 11 105.1 M 56 23 66.6 M 
Industrial 34 8 87.5 M 96 57 55.2 M 
Media 9 2 8.9 M 39 11 28.9 M 
Real Estate 6 3 29.6 M 5 2 1.2 M 
Technology 48 13 47.1 M 74 33 74.8 M 
Telecommunications 7 4 38.2 M 15 5 12.2 M 
Unknown 6 2 20.3 M 1 1 13.0 M 
Totals 310 106 792.7 M 492 203 356.1 M 
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as Panel A Chinese non-PIPE RMs. Moreover, the average 
return for Chinese PIPE RMs is 16.67% as compared to 13.57% 
for U.S. PIPE RMs for the same 30 days before the RM 
consummation. The first 90-day window after the RM 
transaction yields 35.96% for Chinese PIPE RMs versus the U.S. 
PIPE RM's 15.81%. Floros and Sapp (2010) report RMs formed 
with shell companies using PIPES experience a significantly 
higher yield of 48% in the first 90 days [2]. Over the first four 
years, Chinese PIPE RMs, on average, return 32.02% compared 
to U.S. PIPE RM return of 8.44%. These results are significantly 
higher than the negative 2.1% two year RM shell results reported 
by Floros and Sapp (2010), but overall, consistent with other 
previous studies (e.g., Gleason, Rosenthal, and Wiggins, 2005; 
Floros and Shastri, 2009) that report RMs using PIPEs 
experience higher returns [2, 4, 6]. In summary, comparing 
results in Panels A and B with respect to short- and long-run 
returns, there is a significant improvement for RMs that use 
PIPES over those that do not. 
Also, as shown by DuVal and Quilliam (2015), PIPE use 
appears to influence the number of firms that survive [18]. Table 
6, Panel A, reveals approximately 58% (102 of 176) of the 
Chinese RMs that do not use PIPES survive two years and 26% 
(46 of 176) four years. In contrast, approximately 23% (62 of 
269) of U.S. non-PIPE RMs survive two years and 19% (51 of 
269) four years. Over 82% (79 of 96) of Chinese PIPE RMs 
survive two years as compared to 58% of non-PIPE Chinese 
RMs. Over 61% (59 of 96) of Chinese PIPE RMs survive four 
years as compared to the 26% not transacting PIPES. U.S. PIPE 
RMs realize a similar difference with over 24% (47 of 194) PIPE 
firms surviving two years as opposed to 19% of non-PIPE U.S. 
RMs. Floros and Shastri (2009) find similar PIPE influence on 
shell RM existence [6]. They report 90.20% of shell PIPE RMs 
survive three years as opposed to 27.5% of firms unable or 
unwilling to receive PIPE financing. Overall, Chinese RMs have 
a have a higher rate of survival than U.S. RMs in the first two 
years (58% versus 26%) and four years (34% versus 20%).  Both 
rates are significantly higher than the Gleason, Rosenthal and 
Wiggins (2005) study of 1981-2001 more prestigious stock 
exchange RMs, which reports 46% of their sample survived two 
years [12]. Although they were exclusively studying U.S. RM 












Table 6 - Chinese and U.S. reverse merger performance comparison of 
transactions with and without PIPE financing 
 
 
      Further analysis shows the Chinese RMs that are most 
profitable and likely to survive over two years are in the energy 
and technology sectors. The most successful U.S RMs are in the 
healthcare and industrial sectors. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INVESTORS 
Although there has been some research of U.S. participants 
in RMs, there has been limited study focused on the foreign 
companies that come to the U.S. through an RM. These 
transactions are important as foreign firms entering the U.S. 
have accounted for over 40% of RMs taking place on U.S. 
exchanges from 2004 - 2013, as compared to approximately 
10% of all cross-listings and 7% of all IPOs during the same 
period. This study focuses on RMs that involve Chinese 
companies merging with U.S. firms, which have accounted for 
over 63% of RMs into the U.S. since 2008. Although 
accusations of fraud resulted in a significant decline in the 
number of foreign RMs in 2011, Chinese RMs have experienced 
a rapid growth rate of 32 – 50 % per year since 2012. This swift 
resurgence in the number of Chinese RMs and ongoing 
investigations have investors questioning the related adjusted 
risk returns and motivated this study. This paper helps to fill this 
research gap as it examines and compares the financial 
transactions and performance of foreign and U.S. RMs, and is 
the first to provide insight on the influence of PIPEs (traditional 
and structured) on both foreign and domestic firms that transact 
RMs on U.S stock exchanges. 
Overall, this analysis finds Chinese RMs, when compared to 
U.S. RMs, are significantly bigger, grow assets faster, are less 
include likely to use PIPES but have significantly larger 
transactions and hold more insider stock. In addition, when 
Panel A.  Reverse mergers performance without PIPE financing 
  







U.S.      
  Event 
Window N BHR t-statistic N BHR t-statistic 
[-30, -1] 176 9.88 2.89*** 269 4.83 4.44*** 
[0, +1] 176 14.83 3.15*** 269 3.96 4.17*** 
[0, +3] 176 15.56 3.44*** 269 3.88 3.83*** 
[0, +7] 176 15.89 3.58*** 267 3.45 3.81*** 
[0, +14] 175 14.56 3.73*** 264 -1.58 3.72*** 
[0, +30] 171 15.02 4.69*** 248 -3.74 3.21*** 
[-30,+60] 170 16.44 4.71*** 244 3.54 3.09*** 
[0, +90] 168 15.78 4.45*** 243 -0.76 3.19*** 
[0, +180] 155 17.36 4.01*** 233 2.93 3.28*** 
[0, +1 yr] 138 18.93 3.86*** 147 3.24 2.97*** 
[0, +2 yr] 102 22.07 3.77*** 62 4.59 2.84*** 
[0, +3 yr] 76 23.11 3.26*** 55 5.88 2.77*** 
[0, +4 yr] 46 23.65 2.75*** 51   6.51 2.66*** 
    Panel B. Reverse mergers with PIPE financing 
  






U.S.      
Event 
Window N BHR t-statistic N BHR t-statistic 
[-30, -1] 96 16.67 2.89*** 194 13.57 3.15*** 
[0, +1] 96 22.86 3.78*** 194 12.82 2.87*** 
[0, +3] 96 30.94 3.81*** 194 12.95 2.93*** 
[0, +7] 96 33.77 4.76*** 194 14.03 3.12*** 
[0, +14] 96 29.03 4.53*** 192 15.44 3.21*** 
[0, +30] 96 27.82 4.28*** 187 14.32 3.33*** 
[-30,+60] 95 37.22 4.53*** 183 16.73 3.42*** 
[0, +90] 94 35.96 3.96*** 177 15.81 3.77*** 
[0, +180] 91 34.85 3.74*** 172 11.07 3.55*** 
[0, +1 yr] 87 33.51 3.13*** 126 9.55 2.88*** 
[0, +2 yr] 79 32.73 3.02*** 65 9.41 2.74*** 
[0, +3 yr] 64 32.42 2.91*** 51 8.89    2.69*** 
[0, +4 yr] 59  32.02 2.88*** 47 8.44 2.67*** 
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compared to RMs transacted between two U.S. firms, on 
average, Chinese companies who engage in RMs through the use 
of PIPES 1) raise over 400% more initial investment, 2) have 
higher post-merger market capitalization valuations, 3) 
experience higher short-term returns, 4) take place on more 
prestigious U.S. stock exchanges (NASDAQ and NYSE), 5) 
have a higher rate of continued existence over the first two and 
four year periods, 6) chances for survival may be influenced by 
sector, and 7) contrary to many findings in the literature, 
experience significantly better long-term performance. In 
addition, PIPE financing appears to be a primary source of 
funding for the Chinese RMs that locate on higher exchanges as 
opposed to very few U.S. RMs, and Chinese RMs that open on 
higher exchanges using PIPES have a higher chance of survival 
than those that do not use PIPES or that open on the OTC stock 
market. 
In summary, although RMs do seem to involve considerable 
risk, many Chinese and U.S. RMs generate positive long-term 
performance for shareholders of the new entity, particularly 
those that raise capital using PIPES. We believe these results 
have significant implications for investors, future researchers, 
and the SEC to better understand and identify the characteristics 
of foreign RMS that are more likely to fail.  
Future research may find compelling results analyzing the 
differences in performance for RMs using structured versus 
traditional PIPES. 
REFERENCES 
[1] W. Sjostrom, “The truth about reverse mergers,” Entrepreneurial Business
Law Journal, vol. 2, 2008.
[2] I. Floros and T. Sapp, “Shell games: On the value of shell companies,” 
SSRN Working Paper Series, 2010.
[3] D. Feldman and S. Dresner, “Reverse mergers and other alternatives to 
traditional IPOs, Bloomberg Press: New York, 2010.
[4] K. Gleason, R. Jain, and L. Rosenthal, “Alternatives for going public: 
Evidence from reverse takeovers, self-underwritten IPOs, and traditional 
IPOs,” working paper, Florida Atlantic University, 2006.
[5] M. Pagano, F. Panetta, and L. Zingales, “Why do companies go public?” 
Journal of Finance, vol. 53, pp. 27-64, 1998. 
[6] I. Floros and K. Shastri, “A comparison of penny stock initial public 
offerings and reverse mergers as alternative mechanisms for going 
public,” SSRN Working Paper Series, 2010. 
[7] B. Alpert and L. Norton, “Beware this Chinese export,” Barron’s, New 
York, August 2010.
[8] PrivateRaise and Deal Flow Media, 2014. 
[9] B. Alpert, “Mergers that don’t enrich shareholders”, Barron’s, New York,
January 2011. 
[10] Barron’s, “Mergers that don’t enrich shareholders,” 2010.
[11] Y. Chen, G. Hu, L. Lin, and M. Xiao, “GAAP differences or accounting 
fraud? Evidence from Chinese reverse mergers delisted from US 
markets,” Journal of Forensic and Investigative Accounting, vol. 7, pp. 
122-145, 2015. 
[12] K. Gleason, L. Rosenthal, and R.A. Wiggins, “Backing into being public: 
an exploratory analysis of reverse takeovers, Journal of Corporate 
Finance, vol. 12, pp. 54-79, 2005. 
[13] F. Adjei, K. Cyree, and M. Walker, “The determinants and survival of 
reverse mergers versus IPO’s,” Journal of Economics and Finance, vol.
32, pp. 176-194, 2008. 
[14] C. Carpentier, D. Cumming, and J. Suret, “The value of capital market 
regulation: IPOs versus reverse mergers, Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 56-91, 2012. 
[15] E. Makamson, “The reverse takeover: implications for strategy,”
Academy of Strategic Management Journal vol. 9, num. 1, pp. 111-126, 
2010. 
[16] J. Jindra, T. Voetmann, and R. Walkling, “Reverse mergers: The Chinese 
experience,” SSRN Working Paper, Fisher College of Business, 2012.
[17] C.M. Lee, K.K. Li, and R. Zhang, “Shell games: are Chinese reverse
merger firms inherently toxic?” SSRN 2155425, 2015. 
[18] C. DuVal and W. Quilliam, “A study of Chinese companies using reverse
mergers (RMs): performance and survival,” GSTF Journal on Business 
Review (GBR), vol. 4, pp. 123-125, 2015. 
[19] M. Hertzel, M. Lemmon, J.S. Linck, and L. Ress, “Long-Run 
Performance Following Private Placements of Equity,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 71, no. 6, pp. 2595-2617, 2002. 
[20] P. Hillion and T. Vermaelen, “Death sprial convertibles,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, vol. 71, no. 2, pp. 381-415, 2004. 
[21] L. Fisher, D. Weaver, and G. Webb, “Removing biases in computed 
returns,” working paper, Rutgers University, 2009.
Authors’ Profile 
Charles W. DuVal is an Assistant Professor of Finance in 
the Barnett School of Business at Florida Southern College, 
Lakeland, FL 33801 USA (e-mail:  ccuval@flsouthern.edu).  
He earned his Ph.D. in business administration with a 
concentration in finance from Old Dominion University in 
2012. 
Will Quilliam is an Associate Professor of Accounting in 
the Barnett School of Business at Florida Southern College, 
Lakeland, FL 33801 USA 
(e-mail:  wquilliam@flsouthern.edu).  He earned his Ph.D. in 
accounting from the University of Florida in 1991. 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.4 No.4, October 2016 
©The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access by the GSTF.
16
